Even arresting 'kingpins' won't reduce US drug demand

Arresting drug dealers was never a winning Drug War strategy because, as long as demand existed, there was always a willing supplier ready to replace anyone who was arrested, prosecuted, jailed, or even killed. As it turns out, that's true at the highest echelons of the international drug trade.

These changes arguably justify dismantling much of the federal drug enforcement infrastructure as we know it, argued an article in Foreign Affairs by Steven Dudley published this spring, declaring "the days of the monolithic, hegemonic criminal groups with all-powerful leaders are over." As a result, "For U.S. policymakers, it may be overkill to direct the resources of six federal law enforcement agencies toward dismantling these groups, especially in the era of synthetic drugs."

The author observed that today there are "a wide variety of American, Chinese, Dominican, Indian, and Mexican groups supplying the U.S. market, some that conduct almost all of their business online from within the United States."

The FA story linked to a detailed report on Fentanyl smuggling via Mexico and China that's worth a look for those interested in either addiction or drug enforcement. Texas largely has been spared a huge fentanyl problem essentially by chance: the cartels that supply Texas sell "black tar" heroin which doesn't mix well with fentanyl, while heroin that comes to the northeast and midwest from Dominican suppliers or from the Sinaloa cartel on the west coast is more easily mixed. Check out the spike in national overdose deaths associated with the rise of fentanyl:

None of this is to say Texas has no overdose problem. We do, and it's worsening. But it's so far been focused more on meth and cocaine than opiods.

Regardless, the death total was heightened by the Governor's veto of and continued opposition to Good Samaritan legislation. Moreover, the state's failure to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act keeps drug treatment out of reach for nearly all low-income people except through the justice system. Jails and prisons are a poor and ineffective substitute for free-world healthcare, for addiction as much as for mental illness.

Notice, none of the things that would actually save lives involve chasing down drug suppliers in other countries. That has shown to be fruitless. What Americans refer to as "cartels" are really vast hydra-like webs of interconnected companies and criminal organizations that readily reproduce the function of any and every severed limb. Many, many billions of US taxpayer dollars have been spent trying to slay these beasts and for every head severed, two grow in its place.

This isn't new, by the way, it's always been true. It was easy for anyone paying attention to the world of drug smuggling to see that shooting Pablo Escobar solved nothing. Only reducing US-side demand can scale back the scope of the drug trade.

American law enforcement largely has failed, or more aptly, refused to accept this reality. As Upton Sinclair famously put it, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.”

The "kingpin" model justified numerous law-enforcement strategies - e.g., expanded use of asset forfeiture, reduced Fourth Amendment protections, abetting the rise of SWAT teams and execution search warrants via SWAT-like "dynamic entry" -  that in practice mostly empower law enforcement in petty, workaday cases. For many years, the drug war was also a reliable source of federal pork.

All this was justified by the idea that trolling for "little fish" could lead to catching "big fish." But even the big fish turned out to be parts of massive schools and were easily replaced. We have decades of evidence that catching, jailing, or even killing "kingpins" does nothing to reduce addiction in the United States.

So if supply-side interdiction has proved pointless, what might affect the demand side? The best way to reduce demand would be to expand Medicaid to access treatment funds to fight addiction. Another recently proven method is to encourage legal, domestic sourcing. Pot legalization in many states has bolstered domestic supply and substantially reduced, but not eliminated, demand for illegal imported marijuana, as demonstrated in this data from the fentanyl report mentioned above:

One final thought: The myopic focus of US drug policy on Latin America is an odd thing, because Afghanistan is overwhelmingly the most important source of illicit opiods coming into the US, according to the Department of State (p. 29 of the pdf):

But drugs are almost exclusively portrayed in the press as a Mexico problem. (China's role was particularly highlighted in the fentanyl report.) In fact, the international illicit drug trade is a global problem, one fueled almost entirely by an insatiable US demand. As long as demand, and prices, remain high, no supply-side intervention will ever "solve" it. As the Foreign Affairs story colorfully concluded:

El Chapo was a powerful and wealthy drug lord, and bringing him down was an undeniably important step in curtailing the reach of Mexico’s cartels. But burnishing his status as a kingpin perpetuates a false narrative that destroying him—and those like him—will solve the problems posed by the drug trade. In fact, convicting one drug lord is more akin to plucking a single bee from the hive.