Showing posts with label attorney-client privilege. Show all posts
Showing posts with label attorney-client privilege. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

Travis County Jail recorded attorney-client phone calls, gave them to prosecutors

When the Travis County Jail installed video visitation technology and ceased the practice of in-person visitation, they promised that attorneys conversations wouldn't be recorded. Turned out, that's not always true. Reported the Austin Statesman ("Lawsuit: Travis County inmates' calls to defense lawyers were recorded, shared with prosecutors," April 29):
A group of Austin defense lawyers and prisoners is suing the top law enforcement agencies in Travis County, alleging the private Dallas firm hired to tape inmate visits at county jails is illegally capturing their conversations with attorneys and turning over the recordings to prosecutors.

The Austin Lawyers Guild, the Prison Justice League and several independent defense attorneys are seeking that a federal judge order authorities to stop the practice, which they call “unconstitutional eavesdropping and an invasion of attorney-client communication,” according to the lawsuit filed Tuesday in a U.S. district court in Austin. They say they also want the sheriff’s office and Securus Technology Inc. to destroy all the copies of such phone and jail calls already in existence, which could number in the thousands.
Named in the suit were the Sheriff, the vendor Securus Technologies, and the district and county attorneys offices.
Both parties claim visits between defendants and their legal counsel are secure, completely confidential and not recorded, as protected by attorney-client privilege, the lawsuit states. But prosecutors at both the district attorney’s office and the county attorney’s office have procured copies of the private conversations, some of which have been disclosed to defense lawyers among discovery materials, according to the court records.
Judges say the recordings are automatically deemed inadmissible as evidence in court, but the lawsuit alleges some prosecutors are using them to prepare their cases — sometimes to their tactical advantage without admitting they obtained or listened to them.
The Sheriff and DA say the recorded attorney client conversations were mistakes, the result of deputies failing to check the appropriate boxes on computerized forms. But those mechanisms are internal to the Sheriff and there's no mechanism for defense counsel to ascertain whether their conversations were recorded or shared with prosecutors unless the state later hands them over, by which time any strategic damage has been done. Said Austin Criminal Defense Lawyers Association president Bradley Hargis, “Basically, we just have to trust the sheriff and prosecutors not to listen to these calls but we have no way to verify they won’t.”

Similar allegations were lodged against Securus two years ago in Alaska. In Massachussetts, evidence from attorney-client phone calls recorded by Securus was suppressed in a 2006 criminal case. In 2008, NBC News reported that, "In the past two years, privileged conversations between inmates and lawyers have been recorded in Alameda, Santa Clara and Riverside counties in California, as well as Broward County, Fla.; Lansing, Mich.; and Dallas," as well as San Diego, CA.

Since all these were alleged accidents, according to Securus, which in each case promised to implement procedures to keep it from happening again, the assurances that this practice will definitively stop ring somewhat hollow. If nothing else, Travis County should begin providing attorneys with a comprehensive list of calls to and from their client that were monitored or recorded. "Trust us, we're the government" isn't a good enough response given that recorded attorney conversations have already turned up in prosecutors' files.

MORE: From the Courthouse News Service, and see earlier coverage from the Austin Monitor. Here's a copy of the complaint filed yesterday in federal court.

Friday, August 29, 2008

UPDATE: Judge recused who ordered search of attorney's files

Via Texas Lawyer's Tex Parte blog , we learn that "Collin County District Judge Mark Rusch has been recused from hearing a capital murder case" in which he ordered police to search a defense attorney's files. (See prior Grits coverage.) Bill Baumbach has more at the Collin County Observer, which profiles this case along with the Charles Dean Hood fiasco, in which a Collin County judge and prosecutor who allegedly had an affair during Hood's capital murder trial want to put off answering questions about it until after he's executed.

It can't be stated often enough: Collin County justice is really something!

Sunday, August 03, 2008

One of these days these boots are going to walk all over your attorney-client privilege

Bill Baumbach at the Collin County Observer has the scoop on the story of the Judge who issued a search warrant for a defense attorney's files in a high profile murder case. Most alarming is news that officers removed documents from the attorney's files that do not correspond to any item the warrant ordered them to seize. Reported Baumbach:
Judge Mark Rusch issued a search warrant, stipulating that a court "Master", Eric Higgins would be present. The warrant also required all evidence seized to be turned over to Judge Rusch for his "in camera" inspection.

The warrant specifically required the police to seize:
"a. Letters, cards and envelopes written at and/or sent from the Collin County Jail by inmate Mark Bell, to his spouse, Linda Bell..."
"b. A shoe box and
c. Men's boots."

The return inventory of items seized, however listed:
1. "Six envelopes containing handwritten letters"
2. "Sealed orange and white box"
3. "Multiple paged stapled document"

No boots were found, no timecard was ever mentioned and even more troubling was the seizure of the "Multiple paged document" not listed in the warrant. ...

Visiting Judge Gary Stephens will hear testimony on conflicting motions by the State and the defense in a hearing scheduled for August 5. As of now, the defense has asked for the recusal of Judge Rusch, and for suppression and return of seized evidence. The State has asked for Keith Gore to be dismissed as defense counsel, so the DA can call him as a witness.

So the boots weren't found and the defense attorney wasn't lying when he told the court he didn't have them. Oops! It really seems like a misstep by police when handling so delicate a matter as a search warrant for defense counsel's files when they seize documents wholly unrelated to the warrant. Once police have seen this material, how can you un-ring that bell?

Those interested in the case should see especially the "notes and links" at the end of Bill's article, including the search warrant affidavit, and this earlier Grits post.

Friday, July 18, 2008

Collin County judge approves search warrant for defense lawyer's files

Maybe the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will finally find a use for that 1856 attorney client privilege rule after all!

The CCA earlier this year postponed proposed changes to attorney-client privilege rules for criminal defense lawyers after a largely blog-generated outcry. The court had proposed getting rid of provisions that Judge Cathy Cochran in a guest post on Grits called a "vestigial tail" with "no wag," arguing that because no evidence had been excluded based on the rule in many moons, it could be safely deleted without troubling attorneys' historic protections.

Defenders of the rule argued that even though the rule had not been interpreted by the courts in many years, it still contained "sympathetic magic" which prevented judges from crossing so clearly drawn a threshold. In other words, judges knew they could never get away with violating privilege, so there were no cases telling them they couldn't do so.

That recent episode made me doubly interested to learn via Bill Baumbach at the Collin County Oberver that "Judge Mark Rusch of the 401st District Court in Collin County apparently issued a search warrant at the request of the DA's office for defense attorney files in a murder case before his court." KRLD Radio reported the search warrant "may be a first in Texas."

This'll be one to watch. It's also another moment that makes me wonder what's the matter with the Collin County justice system?

UPDATE: According to an email from the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, "A motion to recuse the judge who signed the search warrant is currently scheduled for August 5, 2008, at 10:30 am in District Courthouse of Collin County, Texas. The Strike Force Committees of TCDLA and NACDL are involved." From NBC Channel 5 in Dallas, here's a little more information on the case:
Police said Mark Bell fired the shots that killed Craig Nail in his home a day after Christmas 2007.

While in jail, Bell wrote letters to his wife asked her to hang on to certain items in their home.

Bell's wife ended up turning all the items and the letters over to her husband's attorney.

A few days before a scheduled hearing to determine whether detectives were entitled to any of the items, Frisco police served a search warrant and seized the documents from the attorney's office.

The attorney has now hired another attorney who calls the search "illegal" and a violation of attorney client privilege.
See prior Grits coverage of the attorney-client privilege rule:
BLOGVERSATION: Read more lawyerly discussion on the topic from Simple Justice.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

CCA backs off changes to attorney-client privilege rule

The first dead-tree coverage of a proposed change to the Texas attorney client privilege rule didn't arrive until after the idea was retracted. The Court of Criminal Appeals last week backed off a proposed change to Texas' attorney client privilege rule in response to complaints generated in the blogosphere. Reports Texas Lawyer:
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defused a heated debate that has raged in blogs and e-mails to CCA judges over a proposal to eliminate a special rule of privilege in criminal cases. CCA Judge Cathy Cochran says the state's highest criminal court unanimously decided June 16 to defer the proposed deletion of Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(2) at least six months to allow ample opportunity for all interested parties to draft a proposed substitute for that rule or to draft a rule or statute to govern the attorney work-product doctrine.
This was a debate that occurred almost entirely within the blogosphere or though private emails, with the MSM apparently only noticing what was happening after the fact (with the exception of SA Express New reporter Elizabeth Allen on her own blog). Robert Guest at Dallas Criminal Defense Lawyer and Mark Bennett at Defending People first raised the alarm, then Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Cathy Cochran graciously authored a guest post on Grits explaining the court's suggestion. Keith Hampton from the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association authored a guest post in response, while Jeff Rambin at Tyler Appeals also weighed in. See also the academic memo that started all this and an analysis by federal public defender Richard Anderson.

Perhaps it's the case, as Judge Cochran declared in her guest post, that the rule is a "vestigal tail" with "no wag," but the truth is the CCA has trust problems with the defense bar, not least because the presiding judge openly declares herself pro-prosecution. What's more, the court fairly routinely identifies as "harmless error" in its rulings all sorts of egregious errors that clearly did indeed cause harm, a fact the defense bar well knows. So there's little reason for defense lawyers to trust the CCA's good intentions or believe it when the court says the change won't hurt them. From their perspective, the CCA's idea of what's "harmless" routinely includes quite a bit of possible harm.

It was the right move IMO for the court to give the defense bar more time to come up with alternative language. It might be wiser still for the court to just let this sleeping dog lie, vestigal tail and all, letting some future court with more balance and fewer credibility issues with the defense bar tackle purely cosmetic changes to the rules.

Monday, June 16, 2008

Read memo spawning proposed CCA changes to privilege rule

In the interest of providing a complete record regarding the debate over deleting criminal defense lawyers' "special rule of attorney client privilege," I wanted to give readers access to the memo by UT law professor Stephen Goode which originally suggested the change to a committee of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Professor Goode's memo, which appears fairly minimalist and less persuasive than Judge Cochran's recent offering.

RELATED: See also the text of the proposed rule change, CCA Judge Cochran's guest post on Grits, TCDLA Treasurer Keith Hampton's guest post defending the rule, blogger reactions from Tyler Appeals and Robert Guest, and a letter from federal public defender Richard Anderson regarding the proposed deletion.

View from the Piney Woods on proposed deletion of privilege rule

Jeff Rambin over at the Tyler Appeals blog summarizes the controversy over the Court of Criminal Appeals proposed deletion of what Judge Cathy Cochran called a "vestigal tail" with "no wag" - the attorney client privilege Rule 503(b)(2), and concludes the CCA shouldn't rush to change it. While most of debate so far has occurred over what the rule meant in the past, Rambin wisely observes that an "equilibrium" has settled around the "vacuum" of cases regarding the rule, and suggests that discussion of any change should center on the future "post-vacuum" equilibrium. He declares:
I'm for streamlined writing and efficient machines, but once words are put into operation as law or rule, fine tuning those operations on the fly is no longer a matter of clean blueprint draftsmanship. Instead, it's more akin to working under the hood of a NASCAR vehicle as it circles the track. With that in mind: 1. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. 2. What's the rush? After all, another side of the "no recent cases" argument is that there are no troubled waters to be stilled. Which leads to ... 3. Unintended consequences/Newton's Third Law/Strategic Uncertainty. If you set about to destroy something that you say really isn't there but others say is, you are destroying the equilibrium surrounding the uncertainty and creating the need for a new equilibrium to account for a new and now demonstrably certain vacuum. Judge Cochran's rebuttal acknowledges that a new equilibrium will need to be created around the vacuum. But at the moment, nobody can say what that equilibrium will be. So, 4. let's not jump out of the frying pan into the fire. Unless and until there is agreement that the post-vacuum equilibrium will be better than what we've got now, maybe the best thing to do would be to postpone the deletion of the "rule of special privilege." Doing anything else has the feel of taking away the defense bar's chips before everyone sits down at the table.
See also the text of the proposed rule change, Judge Cochran's guest post, TCDLA Treasurer Keith Hampton defending the rule, and a letter from federal public defender Richard Anderson regarding the proposed deletion.

Sunday, June 15, 2008

Hampton defends privilege rule: "The vestigal tail you save may be your own"

Long-time Texas Criminal Defense Lawyer Association stalwart Keith Hampton offered up this response to Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Cathy Cochran's guest post yesterday in which she defended the court's proposed deletion of part of the attorney client privilege rule. See also the text of the proposed rule change, Judge Cochran's post, and a letter from federal public defender Richard Anderson regarding the proposed deletion.

From Keith Hampton, via email -

As one who very much respects the views and great work of Judge Cochran, I agree that the discussion for rule changes should be deliberative and thoughtful, an approach I have no doubt the advisory group has taken, and I am encouraged to see Judge Cochran lead the way. Past TCDLA president Richard Anderson’s letter was offered to the group in that spirit, as was current President Craig Jett’s participation. I also do very much agree the defense bar should write a work product privilege and make it explicit, and we are preparing to do just that. But the elimination of the special rule of privilege has no support among the lawyers who would be directly impacted by its abolition; in fact, defense lawyers are widely opposed, in part because we see no concrete proof in support of any of the more abstract objections lodged against it.

To the law professor who was apparently the chief advocate for the proposal and who somehow feared “mischief” by its retention, I would suggest that “mischief” can be generated as easily by the removal of language as by its insertion. What some prosecutors would do with the change in the law can be left to their (and our) imaginations. As for the perceived frailty of the rule, reenacted in every Code of Criminal Procedure since 1856, its treatment seems unfair: first, it is rendered toothless through judicial interpretation, then its lack of bite is duly noted by scholarly law commentaries, and now its abolition is proposed on grounds that it lacks teeth. If there has been any victim of mischief, it is the rule itself.

While civil practitioners and some scholars may view the rule as “confusing,” it is sparkling clear to the criminal defense lawyer who will take the law at its word: she will be protected from compulsion to divulge “any other fact” arising from her relationship with her client. This language plainly supplements the other provisions regarding the attorney-client privilege, whatever literary criticism might be lobbed against it. For the defense lawyer at the immediate end of a prosecutor’s interrogation, the rule’s clarity is at least comforting, and if adequately enforced, a true shield for the attorney-client relationship.

A defense attorney might argue in a future case, perhaps more successfully than his predecessors, that this language has meaning specific to the realm of criminal defense, where lawyers themselves are targeted by the prosecution to give up confidences and to become the enemy of their clients. It is in the criminal defense crucible where the value of such a rule currently declared to be “lost of meaningful content” might yet be fulfilled. The tail may be theoretically less vestigial than a professor might think, and it will be wagged vigorously the next time the State subpoenas a defense lawyer for “facts” she might have learned by virtue of her representation of someone the prosecution very much would like to imprison or kill. We should keep the rule. To every person who may ponder its worth, you would do well to remember: the vestigial tail you save may be your own.

Keith S. Hampton, Treasurer of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

Saturday, June 14, 2008

CCA Judge Cathy Cochran: Privilege rule proposed for deletion a "vestigal tail" with "no wag"

Here's an update straight from the source on proposed changes to Texas' attorney client privilege rule in criminal cases that's been in place since 1856. I couldn't be more flattered that Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Cathy Cochran offered up this guest post reacting to a recent Grits item quoting Dallas defense lawyer Robert Guest, a law blawgger who's been sounding the alarm. I should be clear, though, as she was, that Judge Cochran is writing on her own behalf as an attorney, not in her capacity as a CCA Judge. (Even so, I wonder if any of the other eight want to sign up for guest blogging stints?!)

For more background,
here's the text of the new rule she's discussing, and here's a letter from a federal public defender defending the rule. Lawyers in particular, let us know in the comments what you think of the proposed rule change in light of Judge Cochran's explanation. And thanks, Judge Cochran, for sharing your views with Grits readers.

From Judge Cathy Cochran, via email -


I am responding to your June 9, 2008, posting about the proposed deletion of Rule 503(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, not as a judge on the Court of Criminal Appeals, but as an attorney who has studied and written about our rules of evidence for 25 years.

The deletion of the “Special Rule of Privilege in Criminal Cases” was proposed by UT Professor (and former interim Dean) Steve Goode, one of the three authors of the Texas Practice Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence. Professor Goode has called this provision a “deceptive little sentence” which is confusing, misleading, and does not have any known independent meaning. In the most recent edition of his treatise, Professor Goode states:
When the consolidated rules of evidence were promulgated [in 1998], it [this “special” rule] reappeared, this time as Rule 503b)(2). The decision to include this oft-repudiated language in the new rule, under the title “special rule of privilege in criminal cases,” is truly bizarre. One can only hope that the Court of Criminal Appeals will reconsider and delete this provision from the new Rule before it generates any mischief.
Professor Goode is a member of the Rules Advisory Panel, an informal working group of two professors, a court of appeals justice, a district court judge, a defense attorney, and a prosecutor that advises the Court of Criminal Appeals on possible changes to the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Appellate Procedure. Professor Goode wrote a scholarly memo to the group in October of 2007, recommending the deletion, and, at its November meeting, the group unanimously agreed that the “special rule of privilege” was confusing, misleading, and devoid of any known content. It recommended that the Court delete it, but added an official comment to the deletion:
This rule governs only the lawyer-client privilege. The deletion of former Rule 503(b)(2) [Special rule of privilege in criminal cases] is not intended to restrict the scope of either the work-product doctrine or the lawyer’s professional duty not to reveal the confidential information of a client. See Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.05.
That is, the deletion did not affect the attorney-client privilege as it is set out in the rest of Rule 503 and it did not affect either the attorney work-product doctrine or the lawyer’s ethical responsibilities of confidentiality. In essence, the deletion was intended to eliminate a vestigial tail that had no wag to it. See Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook, 513 (Houston Law Review 1993) (suggesting that “one might conclude that the last sentence in Criminal Rule 503 is nothing but a vestigial tail carried over from the prior statute where it also had lost any meaningful content.”)

Why did Professor Goode think this rule has no independent meaning in the modern era? The language itself has been enshrined in Texas statutes since 1856. At that time it was seen as part of the common-law attorney-client privilege. In 1965, the Texas Legislature enacted article 38.10 which set out the then-existing attorney-client privilege:
An attorney at law shall not disclose a communication made to him by his client during the existence of that relationship, nor disclose any other fact which comes to the knowledge of such attorney by reason of such relationship.
This was a very succinct (perhaps too succinct) expression of the attorney-client privilege as it existed under the common law. As noted by Mr. Richard Anderson, the Federal Public Defender of the Northern District of Texas, in a recent, scholarly letter to the Court of Criminal Appeals opposing the deletion of Rule 503(b)(2), “A series of cases winnowed the ‘any other fact’ language to providing little additional substantive protection at all” to the common-law attorney-client privilege.

Thus, even before the enactment of the Criminal Rules of Evidence in 1986, this “mysterious” language did not appear to have any independent meaning. When the Criminal Rules of Evidence were promulgated in 1986, the drafters recommended that this infelicitous and superfluous language be left out of Rule 503, but defense attorneys asked that it be included in the attorney-client privilege, if only for its symbolic value. So it was. And, despite the fact that this “special rule” had not been used as the basis for excluding evidence in the twelve years between the promulgation of the Criminal Rules of Evidence in 1986 and the melding of the Civil and Criminal Rules of Evidence in 1998, it was dutifully carried forward in the combined rules. In fact, this “special” rule has not been used to exclude otherwise admissible evidence for more than a century.

It may be thought that this “special rule” is an oblique reference to the attorney work-product doctrine in Texas. It might be, but the scope of the work-product doctrine has been developed by judicial cases, not by this rule. Rule 503 does not even pretend to deal with the entirely distinct concept of the work-product privilege. It deals only with the attorney-client privilege, as the title of the rule states. These are two separate privileges and they should not be confused, mingled, or mashed together. As Professor Goode has argued, the “special rule,” nestled within the attorney-client privilege rule, confuses the two different doctrines.

Mr. Craig Jett, President of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, came to last month’s meeting of the Rules Advisory Panel and asked the group to recommend retaining the “special rule” as a bulwark against encroachment upon the work-product doctrine. He did not believe that the official comment to the 2008 deletion of the “special rule” was sufficient to guard against a possible erosion of the work-product privilege. The Advisory Panel thought that he had valid concerns. It suggested that he and Mr. Anderson draft a proposed rule covering the scope of the work-product doctrine in Texas criminal cases–a separate evidentiary rule protecting both defense and prosecution work product–that might be promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals or as a Code of Criminal Procedure statute to be enacted by the Texas Legislature. It was felt that a rule that actually said something concrete would be more valuable than a “mysterious” rule that, according to Richard Anderson, has only the power of “sympathetic magic.” The panel agreed with Mr. Anderson that
there are few policy arguments against codifying work product as a rule of evidence. The fact that work-product performs a different function than the attorney-client privilege only militates in favor of its inclusion into the rules of evidence. The evidentiary rules provide a legal protection from the court. The professional rules of conduct cannot prevent a court from compelling a defense attorney to testify about facts underlying his investigation of the case. In other words, keeping the provision could only be beneficial for the criminal justice system and hardly causes any harm.
One might conclude that the “special” rule has not caused any harm because its “mysterious language” has been studiously ignored. If Texas criminal practitioners want an effective and meaningful attorney work-product privilege rule, they can and should draft one. “Sympathetic magic” may have some symbolic value, but it surely does not have the value of a robust, explicit, and clear rule that courts may easily apply.

Informed and deliberate debate is essential to the progress of the Texas criminal justice system. One hopes that the current dispassionate and scholarly debate will lead to tangible improvements.

Monday, June 09, 2008

CCA could weaken attorney-client privilege rule in place since 1856

Heads up, criminal defense lawyers!

Robert Guest over at the Dallas Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog reports brings word the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:
is moving to abolish the special rule of criminal attorney-client privilege. This would leave defendants with a much weaker protection currently only used in civil cases.

Here is the [rule] COCA is seeking to abolish-
Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(2)

(2) Special rule of privilege in criminal cases. In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to prevent the lawyer or lawyer's representative from disclosing any other fact which came to the knowledge of the lawyer or the lawyer's representative by reason of the attorney-client relationship.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled (see their proposal here) that this protection will be deleted on September 1st, 2008. COCA has made this decision without any public input. The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association was only notified of this decision after it was made.

This special rule has protected Texans since 1856. There is no reason to change it. This letter by Federal Public Defender Richard Anderson documents the history and case law surrounding 503(b)(2).

You Can Help
The COCA judges who made this decision are also politicians. They are elected by the public and accountable to them. Let these judges know that you do not want 503(b)(2) deleted.

Here is their contact information-
Judge Cathy Cochran, cathy.cochran@cca.courts.state.tx.us
Judge Tom Price, tom.price@cca.courts.state.tx.us
Judge Cheryl Johnson, cheryl.johnson@cca.courts.state.tx.us
Judge Larry Meyers, larry.meyers@cca.courts.state.tx.us
Judge Barbara Hervey, barbara.hervey@cca.courts.state.tx.us
Judge Charles Holcomb, charles.holcomb@cca.courts.state.tx.us

Or you may snail mail your letters to individual judges at:
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, P.O. Box 12308, Capitol Station, Austin Texas 78711

It is bad enough that appellate judges rewrite the Constitution to destroy your rights, now they want to rewrite the rules of evidence.

Yikes! Where'd that come from?

MORE: See Houston defense attorney Mark Bennett's analysis of the proposed rule change, which to his credit he first published back in March.